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ABSTRACT
Dynamic code, i.e., code that is created or modified at runtime, is
ubiquitous in today’s world. The behavior of dynamic code can
depend on the logic of the dynamic code generator in subtle and
non-obvious ways, with significant security implications, e.g., JIT
compiler bugs can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities in the resulting
JIT-compiled code. Existing approaches to program analysis do not
provide adequate support for reasoning about such behavioral rela-
tionships. This paper takes a first step in addressing this problem
by describing a program representation and a new notion of depen-
dency that allows us to reason about dependency and information
flow relationships between the dynamic code generator and the
generated dynamic code. Experimental results show that analyses
based on these concepts are able to capture properties of dynamic
code that cannot be identified using traditional program analyses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Dynamic code, i.e., code that is created or modified at runtime, is
ubiquitous in today’s world. Such code arises in many contexts,
including JIT-compilation, dynamic binary translation, obfuscation,
and dynamic code unpacking in malware. Dynamic code raises new
security challenges, arising partly from the fact that the behavior
of an application containing dynamic code may depend in part on
logic that is not part of the application itself, but rather is in the
dynamic code generator. As a concrete example, Rabet describes
a JIT compiler bug in Chrome’s V8 JavaScript engine that causes
some initialization code in the application program to be (incor-
rectly) optimized away, resulting in an exploitable vulnerability
(CVE-2017-5121) [35]. As another example, Frassetto et al. describe
how a memory corruption vulnerability can be used to modify the
byte code of an interpreted program such that subsequent JIT com-
pilation results in the creation of the malicious payload [15]. As
these examples suggest, vulnerabilities arising from dynamic code
generation pose a significant security challenge [33, 40]. To deal
with such situations, it would be helpful to be able to start from
some appropriate point in the dynamically generated code—e.g.,
an instruction that crashes as a result of the bug, or is part of the
exploit code—and trace dependencies back, into and through the
JIT compiler’s code, to help identify the bug that caused incorrect
code to be generated or the byte code to be corrupted. The key
here is to be able to reason about dependencies and information
flow between the dynamic code generator and the dynamically
generated code so that we can try to determine how the behavior of
the generated code is influenced by that of the code generator. Such
analyses, which we refer to as end-to-end analyses, can significantly
speed up the process of identifying and fixing such problems. Other
examples of security issues arising from dynamic code, which can
also benefit from end-to-end analysis, include evasion based on en-
vironmental triggers, where the dynamic code generator generates
different code based on different environmental values.
Unfortunately, existing approaches to (static or dynamic) pro-
gram analysis do not adequately support such reasoning about
dynamic code modification. Traditional program representations,
such as control flow graphs, cannot handle the effects of runtime
changes to the code, which require accommodating the possibility
of some memory locations having different instructions at different
times during execution. JIT compilers [16, 22] and dynamic binary
translators [31] maintain representations of the code being dynam-
ically modified, but not together with that of the code that per-
forms code modification. Whole-system analyses [11, 14, 21, 45, 46]
perform dynamic taint propagation, taking into account explicit
information flows via data dependencies but not implicit flows via
control dependencies. As we discuss later, they also do not take into
account dependencies that can arise through the act of dynamic
code modification. Thus, existing approaches to reasoning about
program behaviors suffer from the following shortcomings:
(a) they do not provide program representations that allow us
to even ask questions such as “What logic in the dynamic
code generator affected the generation of the faulty application
code?”; and
(b) they do not support notions of dependence that can allow
us to reason about the computation in ways that can help
answer such questions.
This paper shows how this problem can be addressed via a program
representation that is able to capture the structure and evolution
of code that can change dynamically, together with a notion of
dependency that arises from the process of dynamic code generation
and which is not captured by conventional notions of data and
control dependencies. Experimental results show that our ideas
make it possible to reason about dynamic code in novel ways, e.g.,
we can construct backward dynamic program slices, starting from
incorrect dynamically generated JIT-compiled code, to include the
JIT-compiler logic responsible for the problem; and detect situations
where a dynamic code generator embeds environmental triggers
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in dynamically generated code. Such end-to-end analyses are not
possible using current approaches to program analysis.
2 BACKGROUND: CONTROL FLOW GRAPHS
Program analyses are based on representations of the program’s
structure; for concreteness, we focus on control flow graphs (CFGs).
CFG construction for static code via static analysis is well-understood
[2]. However, this approach is inadequate for dynamic code because
code created at runtime is not available for static inspection; instead,
we use dynamic analysis. This has the benefit of being able to han-
dle dynamic code; its drawback is that the constructed CFGmay not
contain all of the program’s code due to incomplete code coverage.
We sketch here how CFGs for static code can be constructed from
an instruction trace obtained via dynamic analysis. The extension
of this approach to dynamic code is discussed in Section 3.2.
Let G denote the CFG under construction. We process instruc-
tions in the execution trace as they are encountered. For each in-
struction I , its properties (e.g., whether or not it is a control transfer)
and its status within G (e.g., whether or not it is already in G) de-
termine how it is processed; we refer to this as “processing I in the
context of G.” If I has not been encountered previously, it is added
as a new instruction. If I follows a conditional or unconditional
jump, it should begin a basic block: thus, if I is currently in G and
is not the first instruction of its block, the block has to be split and
control flow edges added appropriately.
Multi-threading introduces additional complexity because ad-
jacent instructions in the execution trace may be from different
threads and thus may not represent adjacent instructions in the
code. We handle this by tracking the construction of G across all
threads, with each update happening according to the state of the
current thread. By state, we mean that we separately maintain
the call stack, previous instruction seen, current function being
reconstructed, etc. for each thread (i.e. the last instruction from one
thread may be appending an instruction to a basic block whereas a
different thread could be splitting a different block).
3 REASONING ABOUT DYNAMIC CODE
Dynamic code modification can give rise to different versions of
the program, with different instructions and behaviors, at different
points in its execution. A representation suitable for end-to-end
analysis of dynamic code should keep track of the different ver-
sions of the code resulting from dynamic modification. There are
two issues to consider here: (1) what constitutes “dynamic code
modification”? and (2) how should such modifications be captured
in the program representation? We address these questions as fol-
lows. First, we note that in general, heuristic approaches, such as
categorizing a memory write as code modification if it targets an ex-
ecutable section of the program’s memory, may not be sufficiently
precise, e.g., because permissions on memory pages can be changed
during execution, making a non-executable memory region exe-
cutable. We therefore consider a write to a memory location ℓ as
“code modification” only if ℓ is part of some instruction that is subse-
quently executed. Second, even small dynamic code modifications
can result in arbitrarily large changes to the program’s represen-
tation and behavior. In the x86 ISA, for example, the arithmetic
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Figure 1: Phases
instruction “bitwise or” (opcode: or; encoding: 0x0c) can, by flip-
ping a single bit, be changed to the control transfer instruction
“jump if equal” (opcode: je; encoding: 0x0f).
Motivated by these observations, we build our program’s CFG us-
ing dynamic analysis, as described in Section 2, until we encounter
an instruction whose memory locations have been modified. At
this point we are confronted with a potentially arbitrary change
to the program’s behavior and representation. To capture this, we
begin construction of a new CFG, which we link to the previously
constructed CFG using a special type of edge that we call a “dy-
namic edge.” Each such linked CFG corresponds to a “phase” of the
program’s execution. We make this notion more precise below.
Terminology. In some situations, it may make sense to distinguish
between code created at runtime prior to being executed (“dynamic
code generation”) and code modified at runtime after it has already
been executed (“dynamic code modification”). The ideas described
here apply to both these situations, and we use the terms “genera-
tion” and “modification” of dynamic code interchangeably.
3.1 Concepts and Definitions
3.1.1 Phases. The idea behind phases is to partition an execution
of a program into a sequence of fragments φ0,φ1, . . . ,φi , . . . such
that for each φi , none of the locations written by the instructions in
φi is part of any instruction executed by φi . Each φi is referred to
as a phase. Execution begins in phase φ0 with the program’s initial
code. When the first dynamic instruction is encountered, we switch
to φ1. Execution continues in φ1 (including other instructions that
may have been created or modified in φ0) until an instruction is
encountered that was modified in φ1, at which point we switch to
φ2, and so on. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
More formally, given a dynamic instance I of an instruction in a
program, let instr_locs(I ) denote the set of locations occupied by
I and write_locs(I ) the set of locations written by I . These notions
extend in a straightforward way to a sequence of instructions S :
instr_locs(S) = ⋃I ∈S instr_locs(I )
write_locs(S) = ⋃I ∈S write_locs(I )
Given an execution trace T for a program, let T [i] denote the
ith instruction in T , and T [i : j] denote the sequence (subtrace)
T [i], . . . ,T [j]. We define the phases of T as follows:
Definition 3.1. Given an execution trace T , the phases of T , de-
noted Φ(T ), is a sequence φ0,φ1, . . . ,φi , . . . of subtraces of T such
that the following hold:
• φ0 = T [0 : k], where k = max{j | j ≥ 0 and
write_locs(T [0 : j])⋂ instr_locs(T [0 : j]) = ∅};
• For i ≥ 0, let φi = T [k : (m − 1)], then
φi+1 = T [m : n], where n = max{j | j ≥ m and
write_locs(T [m : j])⋂ instr_locs(T [m : j]) = ∅}.
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Figure 2: DCFG: An example
A program execution’s phases capture the different “versions” of
code arising from dynamic code modification during that execution.
An execution with no dynamic code consists of a single phase.
3.1.2 Dynamic Control Flow Graphs. We use the notion of phases
to construct control flow graphs for dynamic code: we construct a
CFG for each phase of the execution, as discussed in Section 2, and
link them together using special edges, called dynamic edges, that
represent the control flow from the last instruction of one phase to
the first instruction of the next phase. We refer to such a CFG as a
dynamic control flow graph (DCFG). More formally:
Definition 3.2. Given an execution trace T for a program, let
Φ(T ) = φ0, . . . ,φn denote the phases of T , and let Gi = (Vi ,Ei )
denote the CFG constructed from the subtraceϕi . Then the dynamic
control flow graph for T is given by G = (V ,E), where:
• V = ⊎ni=0Vi is the disjoint union of the sets of vertices Vi of the
individual phase CFGs Gi ; and
• E = (⊎ni=0 Ei ) ∪ Edyn is the disjoint union of the sets of edges Ei
together with a set of dynamic edges Edyn defined as follows:
Edyn = (last(φi ),first(φi+1)), where last(φi ) and first(φi+1) de-
note, respectively, the basic blocks corresponding to the last
instruction of φi and the first instruction of φi+1.
Example 3.3. Figure 2 gives a simple example of a DCFG. The
static CFG of the program under consideration is shown in Figure
2(a). When instruction I2 is executed, it changes instruction I1 to J1
(indicated by the dashed red arrow), where J1 is a conditional branch
with possible successors I3 and I5. The following is an execution
trace for this program along with its phases:
Trace: I0 I1 I2 I4︸         ︷︷         ︸ J1 I3 I4 J1 I5︸             ︷︷             ︸
Phases φ0 φ1
The first phase, φ0, consists of the instruction sequence I0, I1, I2, I4.
When control returns to the top of the loop at the end of this se-
quence, instruction I1 is found to have been changed to J1. This
ends φ0 and begins φ1, which comprises the rest of the trace,
J1, I3, I4, J1, I5. The CFGs corresponding to phases φ0 and φ1 in
Figure 2(b) are G0 and G1 respectively. Finally, the control transfer
from φ0 to φ1 is indicated via a dynamic edge from the basic block
of the last instruction of φ0 to the basic block of the first instruction
in φ1, i.e., from the block for I4 in G0 to the block for J1 in G1.
The reader may notice, in Example 3.3, that the basic block
containing I4 occurs in both G0 and G1. This illustrates a potential
drawback of a naive implementation of DCFGs, namely, that CFG
components may be replicated across different phases. It is possible
to implement DCFGs to avoid such replication, but in this case
it is important to ensure that algorithms that traverse the DCFG
(e.g., for slicing) do not follow unrealizable paths. The details are
orthogonal to the primary thrust of this paper and so are omitted;
Section 5.2.2 briefly sketches the performance improvements we see
from implementing sharing of DCFG components across phases.
3.1.3 Codegen Dependencies. Dynamic code modification can in-
duce a dependency between the code performing the modification
and the resulting modified code. Consider the following example:
addi r0, imm
loc
mov loc := r1A B
dynamic code modification
code modifier modified code
In this example, B is an instruction that adds an immediate value
imm to the register r0; the bytes of B containing imm are at address
loc. Thus, if loc contains the value 5, then B is the instruction ‘addi
r0,5’. Instruction A writes the contents of register r1 to address
loc, thereby modifying B. When B is executed, the value added
to r0 depends on the value written to address loc by A. Thus, the
execution of A affects the behavior of B through the act of dynamic
code modification, independent of any data or control dependencies
that may exist in the program. We refer to dependencies arising in
this way due to dynamic code modification as codegen dependencies.
More formally:
Definition 3.4. Given an execution trace T for a program, a dy-
namic instance of an instruction I ≡ T [i] is codegen-dependent on
a dynamic instance of an instruction J ≡ T [j] (j < i) if and only if,
for some loc ∈ instr_locs(I ), the following hold:
(1) loc ∈ write_locs(J ), i.e., J modifies the location loc; and
(2) ∀k s.t. j < k < i : loc < write_locs(T [k]), i.e., J is the instruc-
tion that most recently modifies loc before I is executed.
While codegen dependencies resemble data dependencies in
some ways, it is different in one fundamental way. If an instruction
I is data dependent on an instruction J , then J can change the values
used by I , but not the nature of the computation performed by I .
By contrast, if I is codegen dependent on J , then J can change the
nature of the computation performed by I , e.g., from a bitwise-or
instruction to a jump-if-equal instruction as discussed earlier.
3.2 DCFG Construction
Algorithm 1 shows how we construct a DCFG from an execution
trace. The DCFG consists of a sequence of CFGs {Gφ | φ = 0, 1, . . .},
one per phase, linked together by dynamic edges; we refer to the
index φ for these CFGs as their phase index.
Given an execution trace T , we proceed as follows. We initialize
the phase index φ to 0 and the DCFG G to ∅. The setW of memory
locations written in the current phase is initialized to ∅. The CFG
Gφ is initialized to the empty graph and added to G (line 7). We
then iterate through the trace processing each instruction T [i] in
turn. IfT [i] begins a new phase, we increment the phase index (line
10), resetW to ∅ (since no memory locations have been written in
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the new phase that has just begun), initialize the CFG Vφ for the
new phase to the empty graph, and add this newVφ to the DCFG G
(lines 10–12). We then process the instructionT [i] in the context of
the CFGGφ , as discussed in Section 2 (line 13). At this point, ifT [i]
is the first instruction of a phase (line 14), it has been added toGφ ,
which meansGφ has a basic block for it, so we add a dynamic edge
from the basic block of the last instruction of the previous phase to
the basic block of the first instruction of the current phase (line 15).
Finally, we update the set of written memory locations by adding
in the set of locations written by T [i] (line 16). We then continue
the process with the next instruction of T .
Algorithm 1: DCFG Construction
Input: An execution trace T
Result: A DCFG G for T
1 function instr_starts_new_phase(Instr,WrittenLocs):
2 return (instr_locs(Instr ) ∩WrittenLocs , ∅)
3 begin
4 G = ∅
5 φ ←− ∅
6 W = ∅
7 Gφ = (∅, ∅); add Gφ to G
8 for i = 0 to len(T ) − 1 do
9 if instr_starts_new_phase(T[i], W) then
10 φ += 1
11 W = ∅
12 Gφ = (∅, ∅); add Gφ to G
13 process T [i] in the context of Gφ (see Sec. 2)
14 if instr_starts_new_phase(T[i], W) then
15 add a dynamic edge from last block of Gφ−1
to first block of Gφ
16 W ←−W ∪ write_locs(T [i])
3.3 Discussion
The notions of phases, DCFGs, and codegen dependencies, as de-
fined above, refer to an execution trace, and thus to a particular
execution of a program. While this suffices for the applications
we were motivated by, it naturally raises the question of how they
might be extended to encompass multiple execution traces.
As a starting point, we note that for programs that do not have
dynamic code modification, every execution has a single phase,
so the CFG constructed using Algorithm 1 corresponds to a path
through its static CFG. For such programs, the CFGs obtained from
multiple traces can be merged in a straightforward way.
Dynamic code modification makes things more complex because
different executions of the same program can, in the fully general
case, modify arbitrary parts of the program and/or give rise to arbi-
trarily different dynamic code. Specifying a single representation
of that program that captures all of the different possible code that
can result from different executions seems challenging. It may be
possible to identify special cases that encompass real-life software
of interest, e.g., JIT compilers or dynamic binary rewriting systems,
which do not involve arbitrary and unrestricted kinds of dynamic
code modification. Since our motivating applications for this work
did not warrant this additional level of complexity, we leave such
generalizations as future work.
4 APPLICATIONS
4.1 Program Slicing for Bug Localization and
Exploit Analysis in JIT Compilers
Program slicing refers to identifying instructions that (may) affect,
or be affected by, the value computed by an instruction in a program
[1, 27, 43]. Slicing can be static or dynamic; and, orthogonally,
forward or backward. By eliminating instructions that are provably
irrelevant to the computation of interest, slicing reduces the amount
of code that has to be examined in order to reason about it.
We implemented backward dynamic slicing as an application
for evaluating the efficacy of DCFGs and codegen dependencies
for end-to-end reasoning about dynamic code, with the goal of
bug localization and exploit analysis in JIT compilers. Backward
dynamic slicing aims to identify the set of instructions that may
have affected the value of a variable or location at some particular
point in a particular execution of the program. Our implementation
is based on Korel’s algorithm for dynamic slicing of unstructured
programs [27]; however, any slicing algorithm for unstructured
programs would have been adequate.
The algorithm, as originally defined, uses the usual notion of data
dependencies to find last definition of an instruction’s operands:
i.e., given an instruction I ≡ T [i] in an execution trace T , the last
definition of I is the most recent instruction prior to position i in
T such that I is data dependent on J , i.e., J defines some source
operand of I . To work with dynamic code, we modified this notion
to also take codegen dependencies into account, such that the last
definition of an instruction I ≡ T [i] in a trace T is the most recent
instruction J prior to I in T such that either (i) I is data dependent
on J ; or (ii) I is codegen-dependent on J .
It is important to note that the notion of DCFGs plays a crucial
role in providing control flow information needed to construct
backward slices. Analyses that reason about dynamic code solely
through data dependencies, e.g. using taint propagation [11, 14, 21,
45, 46] are unable to capture the effects of control dependencies
and therefore are unsound with respect to slicing.
4.2 Detecting Environmental Triggers in
Malware
Malware sometimes use environmental triggers to evade detection
by performing malicious actions only if the right environmental
conditions are met, e.g., if the date has some specific value or when
certain keys are typed. Current work on detecting such behaviors
is geared towards static code, e.g., identifying conditional branches
with input-tainted operands [6]. The idea is to use dynamic taint
analysis to identify conditional branches of the form
if expr then behavior1 else behavior2
where expr is tainted from (i.e., influenced by) some input values.
Once such conditionals have been identified, it may be possible to
use other techniques, e.g., using SMT solvers to generate alternate
inputs, to further explore the program’s behavior.
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void hide() {
volatile int environmental_trigger = 0;
if (environmental_trigger) {
payload(...); // perform malicious action
}
}
void patch() {
int pg_sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
mprotect((void*) ((((long) &hide) / pg_sz) * pg_sz),
pg_sz * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
time_t rawtime;
struct tm * systime;
time(&rawtime);
systime = localtime(&rawtime);
int day = systime->tm_mday;
int day_test = ~(day - 9);
int day_bits = day_test >> 31; // day_bits == 1 iff day >= 9
int month = systime->tm_mon+1;
int mth_test = ~(month - 7);
int mth_bits = mth_test >> 31; // mth_bits == 1 iff month >= 7
// trigger == 1 iff (day >= 9 && month >= 7)
int trigger = day_bits & mth_bits;
unsigned char* addInstrPtr = ((unsigned char*) &hide);
*(addInstrPtr+11) = trigger;
}
int main() {
hide();
patch();
hide();
return 0;
}
Figure 3: Environmental trigger based on dynamic code
The presence of dynamic code potentially opens up other ways to
implement environmental triggers, e.g., by using the environmental
input to directly affect the instruction bytes generated:
trigger := input()
codebuf := f (trigger)
execute codebuf
This idea can be illustrated by adapting an example of evasive be-
havior, described by Brumley et al. [6], to use dynamic code instead
of a straightforward conditional. The code, shown in Figure 3, uses
bit-manipulation instead of conditionals to evaluate the trigger ex-
pression, thereby rendering inapplicable techniques that rely on
tainted conditionals. The variable day_bits is set to 1 or 0 depend-
ing on whether or not the most significant bit of the value of the
expression day-9 is 0, i.e., whether or not the predicate day ≥ 9
is true. Similarly, mth_bits is 1 or 0 depending on whether or not
month ≥ 7 is true. Thus, the variable trigger is 1 or 0 depending
on whether the environmental trigger—in this example, the predi-
cate day ≥ 9 && month ≥ 7—is true or not. The assignment to
*(addInstrPtr+11) then writes this value into the source byte of
an assignment to a variable that is used in a conditional to deter-
mine whether the malicious behavior is manifested. Note that the
conditional that controls the execution of the payload() function
is neither data-dependent nor control-dependent on the input; in-
stead there is a codegen dependency between this conditional and
the patching instructions, which are data dependent on the input.
Our ap-
proach
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JIT type
confusion
Y X X X
Scoping issue Y X X X
Key:
Y: Picks up dynamic code generator from backwards slice
of dynamic code.
N: Does not pick up dynamic code generator from backwards
slice of dynamic code.
X: Crashes or fails to load.
Table 1: Slicing: Soundness
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Overview
We built a prototype implementation to evaluate the efficacy of our
ideas. We used Intel’s Pin software (version 3.7) [28] for program
instrumentation and collecting instruction-level execution traces;
and XED (version 8.20.0) [23] for instruction decoding. We iterate
over the instruction trace to construct a DCFG for the execution.
We identify dynamic code as follows. We use our own tainting
library during construction of our DCFGs to determine code-gen
dependencies: we taint writes to memory, with each memory write
getting a distinct taint label. For each instruction in the trace we
check whether any of its instruction bytes is tainted, in which case
the instruction is flagged as dynamic.
We ran our experiments on a machine with 32 cores (@ 3.30
Ghz) and 1 terabyte of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04. We used both
synthetic and real-world examples for our evaluation, and com-
pared our results with three widely-used modern dynamic analysis
tools that implement backwards slicing, namely: PinPlay [34] (re-
vision 1.29), angr [39, 42] (commit bd3c6d8 on github), and Triton
[38] (build number 1397), to see whether the slices they computed
captured the buggy JIT-compiler code. For these experiments, we
invoked these tools to incorporate support for self-modifying code
as follows: we set the flags smc_support and smc_strict flags to
true for PinPlay, and loaded our project with auto_load_libs and
support_selfmodifying_code set to true for angr.
5.2 Slicing
5.2.1 Soundness. A sound slicing algorithm does not exclude any
statement that can influence the slicing criterion. In our case, this
means that given some observed behavior in dynamic code that is
the result of some logic in the code that performs the dynamic code
generation, a sound slicing algorithm should be able to identify
the connection between the observed behavior in the dynamically
generated code and the culprit code in the dynamic code generator.
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main:
pushq %rbp
movq %rsp, %rbp
xor %rax, %rax
L0:
leaq L2(%rip), %rcx
leaq L0(%rip), %rdx
sub %rdx, %rcx
imul %rax, %rcx
leaq L1(%rip), %rdx
add %cl, 1(%rdx) ### <<< Gen1
inc %rax
L1:
jno L0 ### <<< Dyn1
L2:
nop
movq $60, %rax
movq $0, %rdi
syscall
(a) Synthetic Benchmark 1
// Source: https://www.quora.com/C-programming-language-Can-
// you-write-a-C-program-to-demonstrate-a-self-modifying-code
int AddTwo(int input) {
return input + 2; // <<< Dyn2
}
void patchFunction() {
int pageSize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
mprotect((void*) ((((long) &AddTwo) / pageSize) * pageSize),
pageSize * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
// Change the byte used in addition in AddTwo()
unsigned char* addInstrPtr = ((unsigned char*) &AddTwo);
*(addInstrPtr+12) = 3; // <<< Gen2
}
int main() {
int out = AddTwo(2);
patchFunction();
AddTwo(2);
return 0;
}
(b) Synthetic Benchmark 2
Figure 4: Source code for Synthetic Benchmarks
5.2.1.1. Synthetic Benchmarks. We used two small examples of dy-
namic code as synthetic benchmarks. These implement relatively
small and simple cases of dynamic code and allow us to focus on
the core concepts underlying our approach.
The first example, shown in Figure 4(a), is a small program writ-
ten in x86 assembly code.1 The instruction tagged as ‘Gen1’ in
Figure 4(a) performs dynamic code modification by adding the con-
tents of register %cl to the memory location with address given by
1(%rdx). The operand of the instruction tagged ‘Dyn1’ is modified
as a result. The instructions Gen1 and Dyn1 both occur in a loop,
with Dyn1 being the backward conditional jump at the end of each
iteration of the loop. When this program is executed, Gen1 repeat-
edly dynamically modifies the offset for the backward jump of the
loop, so that the target of the jump changes with each iteration,
until eventually it turns into a forward jump whose target is outside
the loop. An examination of the execution trace of this program
shows that Gen1writes to the second byte of Dyn1, inducing a code-
gen dependency from Dyn1 to Gen1. Each time we encounter Dyn1
after it has been modified in this way we get a new phase.
The second example, shown in Figure 4(b), is taken from an on-
line discussion forum [4]. It has a function AddTwo() that returns
the value obtained by adding 2 to its integer argument. The instruc-
tion that performs this addition, tagged as ‘Dyn2’ in Figure 4(b), is
modified at runtime to change the value added to the argument
from 2 to 3. The instruction that performs this dynamic code modi-
fication is tagged ‘Gen2’. Thus, Dyn2 is codegen dependent on Gen2.
This example has two phases, with a new phase being generated
upon encountering the new version of Dyn2 after it is patched.
We used our backwards slicing implementation, discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1, on these examples for an initial evaluation of our program
representation. In each case, we computed a backward dynamic
1This code is compiled using the command ‘gcc --static -g -Wl,--omagic pgm.s
-o pgm.out’; the ‘--omagic’ option passed to the linker makes the text section writable
and makes it unnecessary to do so explicitly from within the code.
slice from the dynamic code: namely, the last instance of the in-
structions labeled Dyn1 and Dyn2 as discussed above. In both cases
the slice criteria included the dynamic instruction modified for both
examples, respectively. We found that, in both cases, the slices so
computed contained the instructions that modify/write dynamic
code. Codegen dependencies and DCFGs play a crucial role in this:
for example, the instruction Gen2 in the second example is explicitly
picked up due to a codegen dependency from the patched instruc-
tion Dyn2. There are no data or control dependencies between the
instructions Gen2 and Dyn2, so traditional dependencies alone
would not have been sufficient to pick up the code that does the
dynamic code modification.
To assess the current state of the art in analysis of dynamic
code, we used three popular dynamic analysis tools: PinPlay, angr,
and Triton, to compute backward dynamic slices on the results
computed by these programs. These results are summarized in
Table tab:precision. Our experiments indicate that (1) the CFGs
constructed by these tools do not represent the different versions
of code resulting from dynamic code modification; and (2) while all
three tools successfully included all of the relevant non-codegen-
dependent instructions in the slices they computed, none of them
are able to pick up the code that performs dynamic modification.
5.2.1.2. Real World Examples: To evaluate our approach on real
world software that uses dynamic code, we consider three example
applications: (1) analysis of exploits involving JIT code; (2) bug local-
ization in JIT compilers; and (3) detection of trigger-based evasive
behaviors that use dynamic code. Our goal was to perform end-
to-end analyses on these examples, i.e., start from the problematic
dynamic code and compute a backward dynamic slice that includes
portions of the dynamic code generator where the bug/security
exploit originates. The results are shown in Table 1.
a. Exploit Analysis: We consider three examples of exploits in-
volving dynamic code:
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Tracing DCFG Construction Slicing
Test program Ntrace Tread Ninstrs Nblocks Nedges Nphases TDCFG Nslice Tslice ∆slice
Ex
pl
oi
t
an
al
ys
is V8 OOB to JIT Code Pages 11,134,237 10.68 191,613 41,302 117,158 4 146.88 81,986 433.25 57 %
V8 Escape analysis bug 135,295,168 130.76 245,935 52,929 153,922 3 1,793.23 120,885 10,193.08 50 %
LuaJIT Exploit 464,743 0.60 18,248 4584 12,606 2 7.47 5,139 7.76 71 %
Bu
g
lo
ca
liz
at
io
n OOB Read 14,720,437 14.25 150,115 31,469 92,254 2 196.29 61,511 579.78 59 %
JIT Type Confusion 9,663,365 9.49 158,849 32,536 93,132 9 130.26 67,765 146.47 57 %
Scoping issue 7,882,295 7.56 99,378 22,394 62,204 4 102.31 47,023 970.95 52 %
Key:
Ntrace : No. of instructions in execution trace
Tread : Time to read trace (seconds)
Ninstrs : No. of instructions in DCFG
Nblocks : No. of basic blocks in DCFG
Nedges : No. of basic blocks in DCFG
Nphases : No. of phases
TDCFG : DCFG construction time (seconds)
Nslice : No. of instructions in slice
Tslice : Slice construction time (seconds)
∆slice : Fraction of DCFG removed from slice
= (Ninstrs − Nslice)/Ninstrs .
Table 2: Slicing: Performance
(1) malicious shellcode originating from an out-of-bounds (OOB)
write to the JIT code pages in Google’s V8 JavaScript engine
[10];
(2) escape analysis bug in V8’s JIT compiler (CVE-2017-5121)
[35]; and
(3) malicious bytecode used to escape a LuaJIT sandbox [9].
We analyzed each of these exploits as follows. We used the proof-of-
concept code to compute a DCFG/backward dynamic slice starting
from the dynamically generated exploit code. Separately, we exam-
ined the write ups for each of the exploits to determine the bugs
responsible for each exploit, identifying the buggy code generator
portions in the execution traces recorded for each exploit. We then
checked the slice to determine whether the buggy generator code
is present in the slice.
The first security exploit we consider entails an OOB write to
the JIT code pages within Google’s V8 JavaScript engine [10]. The
exploit is a result of array type ambiguity, which allows for the
author to construct a non-linear overflow with which to write and
execute arbitrary shell code. The original author demonstrated
this by launching xcalc. We modified the same exploit so that the
shellcode instead encounters a divide-by-zero exception to aide in
identifying the dynamic code in the execution trace. We used D8 to
invoke the V8 JavaScript engine from the command line, obtained an
execution trace using Pin, and then constructed a DCFG along with
a backward dynamic slice from the first nop shellcode instruction
that appears in the nop sled immediately before the divide-by-zero
exception. Our backward slice successfully included both the buggy
code within V8 that led to the array type ambiguity along with the
instructions that actually generated the shellcode at runtime.
The second exploit we examined is discussed in detail by Rabet
[35]. It arises out of a bug in V8’s escape analysis and causes some
variable initializations in the JIT-optimized code to be incorrectly
optimized away when performing load reduction. The proof-of-
concept code provided causes V8 to crash while executing the
optimized dynamic code due to an OOB read. The write up provided
by Rabet proceeds to use this OOB read as a stepping stone towards
demonstrating arbitrary code execution. For our analysis of this
example, we built our DCFG from the execution trace recorded
by Pin and then we computed a backward dynamic slice from the
dynamic instruction prior to the exception that is thrown due to
the OOB read. We found that the resulting slice correctly included
the buggy portions of the load reducer in the escape analysis phase
of V8’s JIT compiler, whose optimizations cause the OOB read.
Our final example in this category was with malicious Lua byte-
code being used to escape a sandbox in LuaJIT [9]. The proof of
concept malicious program corrupts bytecode with the goal of writ-
ing shellcode which prints a message. We followed an approach
similar to the one we used to slice the V8 OOB write, starting our
slice at the beginning of the NOP sled used in the attack. We found
that the backward slice computed by our tool correctly picks up
the Lua code that generates the shellcode.
In summary, using our approach we are able to compute back-
ward slices starting at some problematic dynamically created in-
struction(s) and working back to identify the JIT compiler logic that
created that instruction. Our slices make use of our DCFGs when de-
termining removable instructions, allowing for multiple versions of
dynamic instructions to be reasoned about separately. Furthermore,
the addition of code-gen dependencies from our DCFGs allow for
our backward slices to reason about dependencies between the code
that does the dynamic modification and the dynamically generated
code itself. This can be the starting point for further analysis, e.g.,
the slice can be used to determine where and how the shellcode for
the exploit is crafted, whether or not the bytecode was corrupted
during execution, etc. Such explorations are facilitated by the ability
to obtain program slices that contain (a) all versions of the dynamic
code executed; and (b) the code that generates the dynamic code,
linked explicitly through codegen dependencies.
To better understand how well current approaches apply to such
analysis problems, we also used these examples to experiment with
PinPlay, angr, and Triton. The results are summarized in Table 1.
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b. Bug Localization: We consider three JIT compiler bugs from
Google’s V8 JavaScript engine thatwere posted to bugs.chromium.org
and classified as “Type: Bug-Security.”
(1) Empty jump tables generated by the bytecode generator
leading to out-of-bound reads that cause the generated JIT-
compiled to crash (Issue 794825) [17].
(2) A type confusion bug that leads to a crash after the dynamic
code has been generated (Issue 794822) [18].
(3) Arrow function scope fixing bug, where the system can-
not handle certain constructs involving a single line arrow
function, resulting in a crash (Issue 807096) [19].
For each of these bugs we proceeded as follows. To identify the
problematic code in the JIT compiler, we examined the correspond-
ing GitHub commits, together with any relevant information in the
bug report, to determine the code that was changed to fix the bug.
We delineated the problem code so identified using small “marker
code snippets”—i.e., small easily identifiable code snippets that do
not affect the operation of the JIT compiler—and confirmed that
the behavior of the buggy JIT compiler was unaffected. We then
used the example code submitted with the bug report to obtain
an execution trace demonstrating the bug, and used this trace, to-
gether with the DCFG constructed from it, to compute a backward
dynamic slice starting from the instruction that crashed. Finally, we
analyzed the resulting slice to determine whether the problematic
code, as identified above, was included in the slice.
The results of our experiments are summarized in Table 1. Our
end-to-end analysis was able to successfully pick up the buggy code
for each of the bugs mentioned above in the slice, allowing one to
narrow down the functions involved in V8 that lead to the crash.
To assess the efficacy of current state-of-the-art program analy-
sis tools on these examples, we experimented with same dynamic
analysis toolkits considered earlier, namely, PinPlay, angr, and Tri-
ton. None of them were able to successfully analyze the examples
involving V8: they all crashed with internal errors when loading
V8. All three tools were able to process the LuaJIT example with-
out crashing, but none of the slices they computed contained the
JIT-compiler or exploit code that created the dynamic code.
5.2.2 Performance. Table 2 shows the performance of our proto-
type DCFG-based slicing implementation on our real-world test
inputs (the environmental trigger example is omitted because it
does not use backward slicing). These input programs all involve
computations of substantial size: the smallest, LuaJIT exploit, has
a trace of 464K instructions, while the remaining execution traces
range from almost 7.9M instructions (V8 scoping issue bug) to 135M
instructions (V8 escape analysis bug). The time taken to read the
traces (and do nothing else) is roughly 1M instructions/sec.2
The DCFGs constructed typically range in size from about 22K
basic blocks and 62K edges (V8 scoping issue bug) to about 41K
blocks and 117K edges (V8 OOB exploit), with a low of 4.6K blocks
and 12K edges for the LuaJIT exploit and a high of about 53K blocks
and 154K edges for the V8 escape analysis bug. Most of our test
programs have 2−4 phases, with the V8 JIT type confusion example
2Our implementation uses Pin to collect an instruction trace that is written to a file on
disk. The numbers reported here refer to the time required to read such instruction
trace files; the time taken to record the traces and write the trace files, which depends
on the tracing tool used and is independent of the ideas described here, is not included.
an outlier with 9 phases. DCFG construction incurs an overhead of
roughly 15× over simply reading a trace: most of the test inputs take
roughly 2−3minutes, with the lowest time being 7.5 seconds for the
LuaJIT exploit and the highest being about 30 minutes for the V8
escape analysis bug. Since DCFG construction involves processing
each instruction in the execution trace, the time taken depends on
the sizes of both the instruction trace and the DCFG.
The overhead incurred by slicing relative to the time taken for
DCFG construction ranges from 1.04× for the LuaJIT exploit to 9.5×
for the V8 scoping issue bug, with most of the test programs ranging
from 3× to 6×. In absolute terms, most of the programs take about
2 − 10 minutes for slicing, with a low of about 8 secs for the LuaJIT
example and a high of about about 2.8 hours for the V8 escape analy-
sis bug. Slicing is able to remove about 50%–60% of the instructions
in the DCFG, with a high of 71% of the instructions removed for
the LuaJIT exploit. These results are further improved by excluding
code that is irrelevant to the JIT-compiler, i.e., the front-end parser,
byte-code generator, and interpreter. These numbers indicate that
our approach is both practical (in terms of time) and useful (in
terms of the amount of code removed from the DCFG). Since our
approach does not fundamentally alter the slicing algorithm, but
rather augments it to work over DCFGs and use codegen depen-
dencies, it is not difficult to adapt our approach to other slicing
algorithms with different cost-precision characteristics.
Finally, an important aspect of usability is that of scalability. This
is especially crucial for dynamic analyses, since the complexity of
real-world software that use dynamic code, combined with the fact
that they are often multi-threaded, means that instruction traces
can become quite large. In this context, we note that our prototype
implementation, which was built without any particular attention
to performance, is nevertheless resonably scalable and is able to
handle computations of considerable size on software of real-world
complexity (e.g., a trace of 135M instructions from a widely-used
JavaScript engine, corresponding to a CFG containing some 53K
basic blocks and 245K instructions).
As noted in Section 3.1.2, a naive implementation of DCFGs
can lead to DCFG components being replicated across multiple
phases, resulting in a lot of of wasted memory. Our implementation
of DCFGs avoids such replication by associating a set of phase
numbers with each instruction, basic block, and edge in the DCFG;
our slicing algorithm is modified to avoid following unrealizable
paths in the DCFG. For the real-world benchmarks we tested, this
results in a savings of about 18% in DCFG size (no. of basic blocks).
5.2.3 Focusing the analysis: markers and dicing. Given the overall
objective of localizing problems in the culprit JIT-compiler code,
it is useful to examine the extent to which our approach is able
to reduce the amount of actual JIT-compiler code that has to be
considered: for example, a slice that excludes much of the front-
end parser and interpreter, but includes the entirety of the JIT
compiler, would not be very useful. To evaluate this, we repeated our
experiments to focus the our evaluation, as much as possible, on the
JIT-compiler portion of the system. To do this, we placed markers—
i.e., small code snippets that are unambiguously identifiable and
semantically neutral—in the code as close as we were able to the
invocation of the JIT compiler. During analysis, we excluded the
portion of the execution trace before the marker. This effectively
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Original Dicing Improvement (%)
Test program DCFGorig sliceorig DCFGmk slicemk ∆DCFG ∆slice ∆mk
Ex
pl
oi
t
an
al
ys
is V8 OOB to JIT Code Pages 191,613 81,986 90,736 42,317 52.6 48.4 53.4
V8 Escape analysis bug 245,935 120,885 157,847 89,307 35.8 26.1 43.4
LuaJIT Exploit 18,248 5,139 10,354 1,808 43.2 64.8 82.5
Bu
g
lo
ca
liz
at
io
n OOB Read 150,115 61,511 35,261 10,460 59.0 83.0 70.3
JIT Type Confusion 158,849 67,765 188 103 99.9 99.8 45.2
Scoping issue 99,378 47,023 14,896 7,721 85.0 83.6 48.2
Key:
DCFGorig : No. of instructions in original DCFG ∆DCFG : Improvement in DCFG size due to dicing
sliceorig : No. of DCFG instructions in original slice = (DCFGorig − DCFGmk)/DCFGorig
DCFGmk : No. of instructions in DCFG with marker ∆slice : Improvement in slice size due to dicing
slicemk : No. of DCFG instructions in slice with marker = (sliceorig − slicemk)/sliceorig
∆mk : Fraction of DCFGmk removed due to dicing
= (DCFGmk − slicemk)/DCFGmk
Table 3: Dicing: Performance
computed a program dice that excluded the front-end parser, byte-
code generator, and interpreter.
Table 3 gives the results of these experiments. The two columns
labeled ‘Original’ refer to the size of the DCFG and the back-
ward slice computed without markers, i.e., as shown in Table 2; the
columns labeled ‘Dicing’ refer to the size of the DCFG and slice
when markers are used; the columns labeled ‘Improvement’ show
the percentage improvement due to dicing. The columns labeled
∆DCFG and ∆slice show, respectively, the reductions in the size of
the DCFG and the slice when irrelevant code is excluded. These are
in the range 35%–85% for DCFG size and 26%–84% for slice size. The
JIT Type Confusion bug sample is an outlier, with almost all of the
original DCFG and slice eliminated. The final column, labeled ∆mk ,
shows the effects of slicing focusing only on the DCFG resulting
from dicing: these range from about 43% to about 82%. Overall,
these results show that (1) our approach is effective in focusing on
the relevant portions of the JIT compiler; and (2) the use of code
markers to identify entry into the JIT compiler can be helpful in
zeroing in on the relevant portions of the code being analyzed.
5.3 Detecting Environmental Triggers
Our implementation to detect environment-dependent dynamic
code relies on the fact that there must be a codegen dependency
from code that is data or control dependent on some environmental
value to some code that is dynamically generated. We first collect
an execution trace and build our program representation. Next,
we taint the input source and propagate the taint forward. If, at
any point, we find a codegen dependency from an instruction with
tainted operands to an instruction that is later executed, it means
that an input-dependent value may be influencing the instruction
bytes of some dynamic instruction. In this case, we report that there
is dynamic input-dependent program behavior.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, data dependencies alone may not
suffice for reasoning about information flow in dynamic code. We
demonstrate this using a variant of the previous example but uses
void patch() {
...
int final = day_bits & mth_bits;
// Implicit flow here
volatile int x = 0, y = 0, z = 0;
if(final){
x = 1;
} else {
y = 1;
}
if(x == 0){
z = 0;
}
if(y == 0){
z = 1;
}
unsigned char* addInstrPtr = ((unsigned char*) &hide);
*(addInstrPtr+11) = z;
}
Figure 5: Environmental trigger based on dynamic codewith
implicit flow
an implicit flow to propagate the value of the environmental trigger;
the implicit flow code, shown in Figure 5, is based on an example
from Cavallaro et al. [8]. To analyze this example, we compute a
backward dynamic slice with the slicing criterion being the dynam-
ically modified code location at the point where it is executed. This
slice correctly includes the environmental triggers, indicating that
the code modification is influenced by environmental triggers. The
slice also includes the relevant portion of the implicit flow code,
therey demonstrating the utility of the control flow information
obtained from the DCFG. In practice, one might use forward slicing
from the point where triggers are evaluated to determine whether
any dynamically generated code is in the slice. However, our point
here is not so much one of the directionality of the computed slice,
but rather to demonstrate the sophistication of analyses possible
when reasoning about dynamic code using control flow information,
available in DCFGs, together with codegen dependencies.
Our implementation correctly detects that environmental values
influence dynamic program behavior for the examples shown in
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Figures 3 and 5. When tested with S2E, a widely used symbolic
execution engine, we found that the input values used to patch the
function hide() are silently concretized and only the false path is
explored. The popular analysis tool angr gave a similar result.
5.4 The role of codegen dependencies
Program slices are not guaranteed, in general, to be minimal. This
means that it is possible, in theory, for an instruction in the slice
to be included due to imprecision in the slicing algorithm. To de-
termine whether imprecision may have played a role in the results
reported above, we re-ran our slicing tool on each of the examples
discussed above with a directive to ignore codegen dependencies.
For the exploit examples discussed above, our slices were com-
puted starting at a NOP instruction in the NOP sled generated as
part of the shellcode. For each example, ignoring codegen depen-
dencies resulted in the computation of a slice consisting of just the
NOP instruction itself and nothing else. By contrast, when codegen
dependencies were included as part of the slice computation, the rel-
evant JIT-compiler codewas included in the slice. This demonstrates
that codegen dependencies play a crucial role in the computation
of the slice linking the shellcode to the code that generated it.
For the bug localization examples, we found that the JIT compiler
code was included in the slice even with codegen dependencies
turned off. We are currently working on determining whether this
is due to legitimate dependencies in these computations or whether
this is due to imprecision in our slicing algorithm.
5.5 Evaluation Results: Summary
The results from our experimental evaluation demonstrate the util-
ity of DCFGs and codegen dependencies for end-to-end analysis of
dynamic code. In particular, we show the following:
(1) Backward analyses, augmented with the notion of codegen
dependencies and extended to work over DCFGs, can effec-
tively work back from specific behaviors in JIT-compiled
code to the logic in the JIT compiler that resulted in the
generation of that code.
(2) Forward analyses, augmented with the notion of codegen
dependencies and extended to work over DCFGs, can iden-
tify dynamic code that has been affected by environmental
triggers in the course of dynamic code generation.
(3) Our implementation of backward dynamic slicing is practical,
in terms of analysis time; useful, in terms of the amount of
code removed from the DCFG; and scalable, in terms of being
able to handle analyses of significant size involving complex
real-world software.
Experiments with three widely-used dynamic analysis toolkits that
implement backward dynamic slicing. show that these tools cannot
work back from observed behaviors in dynamically generated code
to the relevant code in the dynamic code generator. Finally, for
the identification trigger-based behaviors in dynamic code, current
tools based on stock symbolic execution are not able to fully detect
or explore all possible paths in the dynamic code modifier, while
current tools based on whole-system taint analysis are not able to
handle implicit information flows.
6 RELATEDWORK
There is a large body of literature on program slicing (e.g., see
[27, 36, 41, 44, 47]), but to the best of our knowledge all of this work
focuses on static code. There is also a significant amount of research
on various aspects of JIT compilation, including implementation
[3, 5, 16, 37] and taint analysis in the JITted code [14, 25, 30, 37].
None of these works consider analyses that capture dependencies
between the JITted code and the code in the JIT compiler.
There is a lot of work on dependence and information flow analy-
ses (e.g., see [20, 24, 32]), but these typically do not consider end-to-
end analysis of dynamic code. Several authors have discussed taint
propagation in JIT-compiled code, but focusing on taint propaga-
tion in just the application code rather than on end-to-end analyses
[14, 25, 30, 37]. Whole-system analyses [11, 14, 21, 45, 46] focus
on issues relating to dynamic taint propagation through the entire
computer system. Such systems provide end-to-end analyses but
typically consider only explicit information flows (≃ data depen-
dencies), not implicit flows (≃ control dependencies); they are thus
of limited use for reasoning about behaviors, such as conditional
dynamic code modification (i.e., where the dynamic code generated
may depend conditionally on input and/or environmental values),
which are common in applications such as JIT compilers.
Korczynski and Yin discuss identifying code reuse/injections
using whole-system dynamic taint analysis [26]. While this work
captures codegen dependencies, it does not propose a program
representation that can capture the code structure for the different
phases that arise during execution. As a result, this approach is
not suitable for analyses, such as program slicing, that require
information about the control flow structure of the code.
Dalla Preda et al. describe a notion of phases to characterize the
semantics of self-modifying code [12]. The technical details of their
work are very different from ours. Debray and Patel suggest using
a notion similar to our codegen dependencies to identify dynamic
code unpackers [13], but focus exclusively on code unpacking (e.g.,
do not consider applications such as bug localization or environ-
mental triggers), consider only relatively small malware samples,
and do not address the complexities of large systems such as V8.
There are a number of systems that reason about program be-
havior using dynamic analysis, and therefore are able to perform
some kinds of analysis on dynamic code; examples include PinPlay
[34], angr [39, 42], and Triton [38]. Our experiments indicate that
these systems do not keep track of multiple versions of code result-
ing from dynamic code modification, and as a result cannot fully
capture all of the dependencies arising from runtime code changes.
Cai et al. [7] and Myreen [29] discuss reasoning about dynamic
code for the purposes of program verification using Hoare logic.
We have not seen any implementations to apply their work towards
modern software that utilizes dynamic code (i.e. a javascript engine).
Furthermore, our work is more specific in that we seek to provide
a program representation capable of representing dynamic code.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic code is ubiquitous in today’s world and raises its own set
of security challenges. Existing approaches to program analysis are
not adequate for reasoning about the behavior of dynamic code due
to two main challenges: first, current program representations do
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not adequately capture the effects of changes due to dynamic code
modification; second, they do not account for dependencies that
can arise due to the act of dynamic code modification. This paper
discusses how these challenges can be addressed via a program
representation suitable for dynamic code as well as a new notion of
dependencies that can capture dependencies between the dynamic
code and the code that generated it. Experiments with a prototype
implementation of backwards dynamic slicing based on these ideas
show, on a number of real-world examples, that these ideas make
it possible to work back from the faulty code to the JIT compiler
logic that led to the generation of the faulty code.
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